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Abstract
This paper proposes a model of tripartite blind quantum computation (TBQC),
in which three independent participants hold different resources and accom-
plish a computational task through cooperation. The three participants are
called C,S,T separately, where C needs to compute on his private data, and T
has the required quantum algorithm, and S provides sufficient quantum com-
putational resources. Then two concrete TBQC protocols are constructed.
The first protocol is designed based on Broadbent-Fitzsimons-Kashefi proto-
col, and it cannot prevent from collusive attack of two participants. Then
based on universal quantum circuit, we present the second protocol which
can prevent from collusive attack. In the latter protocol, for each appear-
ance of R-gate in the circuit, one call to a classical AND-BOX is required for
privacy.
Keywords: quantum cryptography, blind quantum computation,
computing on encrypted data, universal quantum circuit, secure two-party
computation
1. Introduction
Blind quantum computation (BQC) [1, 2] is a practical quantum informa-
tion technique combining quantum cryptography and quantum computation.
It is mainly used in the cases that one party has limited quantum computa-
tional resources, and delegates his quantum computation to the other party
who can do it. For example, the quantum computer is so expensive for per-
sonal purchasing, however, the corporation or organization can purchase the
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quantum computer and make money by providing quantum computing ser-
vices to individual customers. Then there is a problem: the customers do
not trust the corporation, and worry that his private data, result and even
the quantum algorithm may be learned by the corporation. The problem can
be solved using BQC protocol, by which the quantum computer can provide
secure cloud services.
BQC deals with the problem: one party with limited computational power
delegates his computational task to another party, and can get the required
result while his privacy (the private data and result) is secured during the
whole process. This problem is firstly studied by Childs [1], and then lots of
BQC protocols have been proposed [3–12]. There are also some development
about the experiment of BQC [12–14]. In current studies about BQC, the
data is supposed to be provided by Client, and the computational service
is supposed to be provided by Server, but the algorithm may be provided
by Client or Server or be public. So, the researches of BQC protocols can
be classified into three kinds. (1) The algorithm is private and belongs to
Client. Most of researches are of this kind [1, 3, 5–9]; (2) The algorithm is
private and belongs to Server, see Ref.[11]; (3) The algorithm is public or at
least agreed on by both Server and Client [4, 12]. No matter which party
the algorithm belongs to, the owner of it should provide better algorithm to
improve the efficiency.
Because the algorithm is an important information, the owner of it wishes
to keep it private during the process of BQC. Currently, the studies focus
on the case that the private algorithm belongs to Client or Server [1, 5, 11].
However, there exists an ordinary case in practice: the algorithm belongs to
the third party, which intends to make money by providing the algorithm in
a private way. In this case, the algorithm can be kept private while making
money, so this mode can encourage the researchers to concentrate on the
studies of algorithm and improve the algorithm.
This paper considers BQC from the aspect that the data, algorithm and
computational resources belong to three independent parties. The model of
tripartite blind quantum computation (TBQC) is proposed, and the possi-
ble adversaries are analyzed, and then three properties such as correctness,
blindness, verifiability are defined. Then, based on Broadbent-Fitzsimons-
Kashefi protocol [5], a TBQC protocol is presented. Finally, the other TBQC
protocol is proposed based on universal quantum circuit (UQC).
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2. TBQC model
2.1. Parties and protocol
The TBQC model involves three independent participants: Client, Server
and Third party, denoted as C,S,T, where C holds the data, S holds the quan-
tum computational resources, and T holds the quantum algorithm. T has
the ability of designing quantum algorithm, and prevents it from revealing
during the interactive process of TBQC. In order to provide better quan-
tum computing services, S tries to provide more quantum computational
resources or stronger universal quantum computer. C has limited quantum
computational power and no efficient quantum algorithm, but he intends to
compute on some private data with quantum computer. He hopes to ac-
complish the computational task by using T’s quantum algorithm and S’s
quantum computational resources, and prevents his data and the required
result from revealing during the computation.
In the TBQC model, the three parties C,S,T play different roles in the
computation. They interactively perform some local (classical or quantum)
computation and communicate through classical or quantum channel, and
finally finish a common computational task while the privacy is secured.
The detailed interactive process is called TBQC protocol. Here the TBQC
protocol is denoted as pi(x, f), where two parameters x, f must be given as
the inputs. The symbol x is the private data owned by C, and the symbol f
is a mapping f : x 7→ f(x), which represents a computational task. At the
beginning of the protocol, C would inform T about the computational task
f(∗), then T can design a quantum algorithm accordingly. The encoding
of the algorithm is denoted as Af . Given an input data x0, the output of
the protocol pi can be described as pi(x0, f). If pi(x0, f) = f(x0), we say the
protocol is correct. The definition of correctness is as follows.
Definition 1 (Correctness). A tripartite blind quantum computation
protocol pi is correct if, given any input data x0 and any required computa-
tional task f : x 7→ f(x), its outcome pi(x0, f) equals to f(x0) when the three
parties T, C and S follow the steps of the protocol honestly.
2.2. Adversarial model
In TBQC model, the privacy contains the data, algorithm and result.
C must prevent his data and result from revealing, and T must prevent
his algorithm from revealing. According to the different attacking targets,
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the adversarial model can be classified into three kinds: attacking the data,
attacking the algorithm, and attacking the result.
The attacker may be some one of the three parties or two of them. The
outer hacker may also participate the attacking. However, the outer hacker
cannot obtain more information about the privacy than any one of the three
parties. If the protocol can prevent inner attackers, then it can also prevent
outer attackers. Thus, when considering adversarial model, it is analyzed
only the inner attack by the dishonest participants.
During the interaction of the protocol, T sends his quantum algorithm
as messages in a private way, so the attackers or dishonest parties may take
some measures to obtain some information about the algorithm. Because
the algorithm is private information that belongs to T, T must provide the
algorithm in a private way, and then the other parties (C or S) can only use
the algorithm, but cannot obtain the algorithm during the computation.
Similarly, in order to secure the data, C has to provide the data in a
private way (the most common way is encryption), and then the other parties
can only use them in computation, but cannot learn them.
Attacking the result includes two aspects: (1) the passive adversaries do
not disturb the execution of protocol, but snatch some information about
the final result; (2) the active adversaries maliciously disturb the execution
of the protocol, and cause a wrong outcome.
In order to prevent the result from passive adversaries, it is required that
the final result can only be decrypted by C in the protocol. The malicious
disturbance may be caused by either the outer attackers or the inner par-
ticipants. For instance, T provides an incorrect quantum algorithm, or S
does not obey the protocol strictly. For this kind of active adversaries, when
designing a TBQC protocol, a mechanism should be introduced to detect
the destruction, so that C can judge the correctness of the final result. The
disturbance may also be caused by outer attackers who break the commu-
nication channel. This kind of attack exists usually in all communication
protocol, and will not be considered in this paper.
Besides, there exists another kind of adversaries: in order to attack the
privacy of certain party, the other two parties may cooperate by sharing their
information with each other. For example, S and T may cooperate in order to
attack the data and result, which is the privacy of C. This kind of adversaries
is called collusive attack.
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2.3. Security definitions
Because the data, the algorithm, and the result are private information, a
secure TBQC protocol must prevent these information from revealing. This
property is called blindness. Its definition is as follow.
Definition 2 (Blindness). A TBQC protocol pi is blind if, given any
input data x0 and any required computational task f : x 7→ f(x), nothing
about x0 and the quantum algorithm Af of f and the outcome pi(x0, f) is
leaked. Here the quantum algorithm Af is a series of instructions of quantum
operators, and belongs to T; The input x0 and the outcome pi(x0, f) belong
to C.
Because the protocol may be disturbed by the attackers and does not
executed as expected, C must judge the correctness of the final result. Thus,
a verifiable mechanism is required to check the final result. It is another
property of TBQC protocol, and is called verifiability.
In the following, the honestly executed TBQC protocol is denoted as pi,
while the actually executed protocol is denoted as pi′. So, the protocol pi′
may be different with ideal protocol pi, where there exists adversaries.
It is worth to notice that, there exists some problems that are hard to
solved, however, if given a result, it is easy to verify whether it is right or not.
We take the prime factorization problem for example. It can be described
simply as a mapping f : x 7→ (p, q), where x = p · q. If the protocol pi has
not been disturbed, it outputs the result pi(x, f) = (p, q), where p · q = x,
otherwise, it outputs pi′(x, f) = (p′, q′), where p′ · q′ 6= x. Obviously, the right
result (p, q) and the wrong one (p′, q′) can be distinguished with certainty.
After the TBQC protocol is executed with the input x, f , the Client can
verify the output (p′, q′): if p′ · q′ 6= x, then the protocol pi is not executed as
expected, and the Client rejects the result.
It can be seen from the example that, for a class of problems such as NP
problems, the answers can be verified easily. Then the TBQC protocol for
computing them is verifiable. However, this kind of verifiability is not uni-
versal for all problems. So it is called weak verifiability here. The definition
is as follow.
Definition 3 (Weak Verifiability). We say a TBQC protocol pi is
verifiable for a class C of problems if, given any input data x0 and any f ∈ C,
the two outcomes pi(x0, f) and pi
′(x0, f) can be distinguished with probability
more than 1
2
.
For a TBQC protocol with weak verifiability, it is verifiable for a class
of computational problems C, but not verifiable for other problems. If a
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verifiable mechanism is added into the TBQC protocol, the verifiability be-
comes independent of the problems [15]. We define this kind of verifiability
as strong verifiability.
Definition 4 (Strong Verifiability). We say a TBQC protocol pi is
strong verifiable, if it is verifiable for all computational problems.
3. TBQC based on measurement-based quantum computation
Ref.[5] proposed a BQC protocol. We can modify it and get a TBQC
protocol. In the protocol, some classical and quantum information should be
transferred privately with other quantum cryptographic primitives. Because
the focus of this paper is TBQC protocol, we will not state how to secure
the communication between them.
Before the execution of TBQC protocol, C should inform T about the
computational task, then T designs a quantum algorithm accordingly. Next,
the first TBQC protocol is presented as follow. We adapt the same notations
as Ref.[5].
Protocol 1
1. C encrypts data: For each input column (x = 0, y = 1, · · · , m) corre-
sponding to C’s data, (1) C randomly selects θ0,y ∈ {
kpi
4
|k = 0, 1, · · · , 7},
and applies Z0,y(θ0,y); (2) C randomly selects i0,y ∈ {0, 1}, and applies
X
i0,y
0,y . C sends the qubits to S in a secure way. C sends all the θ0,y and
i0,y to T in a secure way.
2. T prepares qubits: For each column x = 1, · · · , n − 1, and each row
y = 1, · · · , m, T randomly selects θx,y ∈ {
kpi
4
|k = 0, 1, · · · , 7}, and
produces single qubit |φx,y〉 = |+θx,y〉. T sends all the qubits to S.
3. S prepares brickwork state: After receiving all qubits from C, S in-
forms C. After receiving all qubits from T and C, S produces some
qubits |φn,y〉 = |+〉(y = 1, · · · , m). Using all the received qubits and
prepared qubits, S creates an entangled state according to their indices,
by applying Controlled-Z gates between the qubits in order to create a
brickwork state.
4. T and S compute interactively: For each column x = 0, 1, · · · , n−1,
and each row y = 1, · · · , m, according to the algorithm designed by T,
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T and S carries out some interaction and measurement (the details can
be seen in Ref.[5]). Finally, T obtains some measured values sx,y (these
values are unknown for S), and S can obtain m qubits, which is just
the encrypted result that is required by C.
5. Secure communication: T sends all the measured values sx,y to C in
a secure way; S sends the final m qubits to C in a secure way.
6. Decryption: After receiving the m qubits and all the values sx,y, C ap-
plies Pauli operation Zs
Z
n,yXs
X
n,y(y = 1, · · · , m) on all the m qubits,
where the values of sZn,y and s
X
n,y can be calculated from the values sx,y.
Protocol 1 is analyzed from the correctness and security (blindness and
verifiability) in the following.
Theorem 1 (Correctness). Assume C, S and T follow the steps of
Protocol 1, then the outcome is correct.
Proof. This protocol is modified from the protocol in Ref.[5]. In fact,
this modification changes only the way of interaction, but has not changed
the computing process. Obviously, if the participants T and S join together,
Protocol 1 would degenerate into the protocol in Ref.[5]. Thus, the outcome
of this protocol is also correct. 
Theorem 2 (Blindness). Protocol 1 is blind.
Proof. The blindness of the protocol should be analyzed from the fol-
lowing three points. The former two points hold in the case that S and T
would not cooperate. (1) The data will not leak. C encrypts his data and
sends the encrypted data and the key to S and T separately. If S and T do
not cooperate, the data will not leak. (2) The result will not leak. After the
interaction of S and T, T owns only the decryption key, and S owns only the
encrypted result. If they do not cooperate, the result will not leak. (3) The
algorithm will not leak. In the protocol, the algorithm is only used in the
interaction of T and S. Because the protocol in Ref.[5] does not reveal the
algorithm, Protocol 1 does not leak the algorithm. In conclusion, Protocol 1
is blind. 
Protocol 1 does not satisfy strong verifiability. It only satisfies weak
verifiability, that means the obtained result can be verified for only a class
of problems.
Theorem 3. Protocol 1 cannot defeat collusive attack of S and T.
Proof. In the first step, C sends the encrypted data and the key to S and
T separately; So S and T can get the data if they cooperate. In the fourth
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step, S and T can get the encrypted result and the key separately; So they
can also get the result if they cooperate. Thus, Protocol 1 cannot defeat
collusive attack of S and T. 
In the next section, the second TBQC protocol is proposed, and it can
defeat collusive attack.
4. TBQC based on universal quantum circuit
4.1. Main idea
Definition 5 (Universal Quantum Circuit [16]). Fix n > 0 and let
U be a collection of unitary transformations on n qubits. A quantum circuit
CU on n+m qubits is universal for U if, for each transformation U ∈ U , there
is a string eU ∈ {0, 1}
m (the encoding) such that for all strings d ∈ {0, 1}n
(the data),
CU(|d〉 ⊗ |eU〉) = (U |d〉)⊗ |eU〉. (1)
According to the definition, we can propose a TBQC protocol based on
UQC. The main idea is as follows: the data |d〉 is provided by C, the encoding
|eU〉 of the transformation U ∈ U is provided by T, and the UQC (or quantum
computer) CU is provided by S. By using the encoding provided by T and
the quantum circuit provided by S, C can finish the quantum information
processing on his data |d〉, and obtain the result U |d〉.
For a given computational task, T designs a quantum algorithm based on
the quantum transformations in the set U , that is finding a series of quantum
transformations in U , for example U1, U2, · · · , Uv ∈ U , such that performing
these transformations in order can implement the given computational task.
The encoding of the algorithm is the combination of the encodings of the
series of quantum transformations Ui(i = 1, · · · , v), denoted as ei. Using the
UQC CU , the computation of the algorithm U1, U2, · · · , Uv is carried out as
follows:
CU(|d〉 ⊗ |e1〉) = (U1|d〉)⊗ |e1〉,
CU((U1|d〉)⊗ |e2〉) = (U2U1|d〉)⊗ |e2〉,
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
CU((Uv−1 · · ·U1|d〉)⊗ |ev〉) = (Uv · · ·U2U1|d〉)⊗ |ev〉. (2)
Finally, the result Uv · · ·U2U1|d〉 is obtained.
From the above analysis, we can see that, based on UQC, the three parties
T,C,S can finish some quantum information processing on any data when
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they cooperate together. However, their cooperation should be designed
carefully, in order to protect the privacy of T and C. Next, we design a
secure way of cooperation, and get a TBQC protocol.
If the owner S of the UQC is treated as the distrusted third party, then
the construction of TBQC protocol based on UQC is similar to designing
a protocol for secure two-party quantum computation with distrusted third
party. The distrusted third party may obey the protocol for secure two-
party quantum computation, meanwhile, he collects some information about
the privacy of T and C during the computation. In addition, he may also
not obey the protocol and perform some incorrect computation. Inspired
by the protocol for secure two-party quantum computation in Ref.[17], we
design a TBQC protocol based on the above universal scheme of quantum
computation.
The construction of UQC and the universal quantum gates are public.
According to the basic quantum transformations that are implemented by
the UQC, T designs the quantum algorithm, which is a series of the basic
quantum transformations. Here we assume the set of quantum gates used in
the construction of UQC is {X, Y, Z,CNOT, H, P,R}, which is the same as
that in Ref.[17]. In the TBQC protocol, initially, C and T select the random
numbers Key0C = (C
0
x, C
0
z ) and Key
0
T = (T
0
x , T
0
z ) as their initial keys, which
are used to encrypt their privacy (the data |d〉 or the encoding of algorithm
|e〉). Then, C and T send the ciphertext of their privacy to S who carries
out the computation of UQC on the ciphertext. At the same time, C and
T update their initial keys Key0C , Key
0
T according to the order of different
gates in the UQC (suppose there are k quantum gates), and finally obtain
the final keys KeykC = (C
k
x , C
k
z ), Key
k
T = (T
k
x , T
k
z ). S carries out the UQC on
the encrypted data and the encrypted encoding, and obtains an encrypted
result.
In order to explain the key point clearly, we express it using some identi-
ties. First of all, some notations are introduced as follows. Suppose the data
is represented by n qubits, the encoding of the algorithm is a series ofm-qubit
string. The initial keys C0x, C
0
z , T
0
x , T
0
z are four n +m-bit random numbers,
and each of them can be regarded as two parts, where the first part has n
bits and the second part has m bits. Let the set of indices c = {1, 2, · · · , n}
and t = {n + 1, n + 2, · · · , n + m}. Later we denote C0x(w), w ∈ c ∪ t
as the w-th bit of the n + m-bit random number C0x, and denote C
0
x(c) =
(C0x(1), C
0
x(2), · · · , C
0
x(n)), C
0
x(t) = (C
0
x(n + 1), C
0
x(n + 2), · · · , C
0
x(n + m)).
Then we have C0x = (C
0
x(c), C
0
x(t)), C
0
z = (C
0
z (c), C
0
z (t)), T
0
x = (T
0
x (c), T
0
x (t)),
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T 0z = (T
0
z (c), T
0
z (t)). Here the n +m-bit numbers C
0
x and C
0
z are randomly
selected by C, and the n +m-bit numbers T 0x and T
0
z are randomly selected
by T. For a n-bit number b = b1b2 · · · bn (bi ∈ {0, 1}) and a unitary operator
U , denote U b = U b1 ⊗ U b2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ U bn . The key point can be expressed as
follows:
CU(X
C0x(c)⊕T
0
x (c)ZC
0
z (c)⊕T
0
z (c)|d〉 ⊗XC
0
x(t)⊕T
0
x (t)ZC
0
z (t)⊕T
0
z (t)|e〉)
= XC
k
x (c)⊕T
k
x (c)ZC
k
z (c)⊕T
k
z (c) ⊗XC
k
x (t)⊕T
k
x (t)ZC
k
z (t)⊕T
k
z (t)CU(|d〉 ⊗ |e〉)
= XC
k
x (c)⊕T
k
x (c)ZC
k
z (c)⊕T
k
z (c) ⊗XC
k
x (t)⊕T
k
x (t)ZC
k
z (t)⊕T
k
z (t)(U |d〉 ⊗ |e〉)
= XC
k
x (c)⊕T
k
x (c)ZC
k
z (c)⊕T
k
z (c)(U |d〉)⊗XC
k
x (t)⊕T
k
x (t)ZC
k
z (t)⊕T
k
z (t)|e〉. (3)
From the Eq.(3), we should find a UQC CU and a key-updating algorithm
that satisfy the above equations. The key-updating algorithm depends on the
UQC in this scheme. This kind of construction can be blind, since S cannot
obtain the data, the encoding, and the result, however, C can decrypt the
encrypted result with the help of T while T cannot obtain the result.
4.2. Protocol
The detail of the TBQC protocol is as follows. At the beginning, C has
informed T about the computational task, and T has designed the algorithm,
which is a series of m-qubit string (suppose there are v m-qubit strings:
e1, · · · , ev). The protocol should run v times. When the protocol runs for
the i-th time, the outcome of the i − 1-th time and each ei is used as its
input.
Protocol 2
1. Encryption of the data: According to the first part of the random
numbers C0x and C
0
z , C performs the following encryption transfor-
mation on the data |d〉:
|d〉 → XC
0
x(c)ZC
0
z (c)|d〉,
and sends the ciphertext to T; According to the first part of the random
numbers T 0x and T
0
z , T encrypts the ciphertext as follow:
XC
0
x(c)ZC
0
z (c)|d〉 → XT
0
x (c)ZT
0
z (c)XC
0
x(c)ZC
0
z (c)|d〉,
and sends the new ciphertext to S;
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2. Encryption of the encoding: According to the second part of the ran-
dom numbers T 0x and T
0
z , T performs the following encryption trans-
formation on the encoding |e〉 of a basic transformation:
|e〉 → XT
0
x (t)ZT
0
z (t)|e〉,
and sends the ciphertext to C; According to the second part of the
random numbers C0x and C
0
z , C encrypts the ciphertext as follow:
XT
0
x (t)ZT
0
z (t)|e〉 → XC
0
x(t)ZC
0
z (t)XT
0
x (t)ZT
0
z (t)|e〉,
and sends the new ciphertext to S;
3. Computing through UQC: For the encrypted data and encoding, S
performs the UQC on them by orderly carrying out each gate Gj ∈
{X, Y, Z,H, P,CNOT, R}(j = 1, · · · , k) of the UQC. Finally, the ob-
tained result is still being encrypted. S sends the encrypted result to
T. (There is an exception here: when Gj = R is performed on a wire
w ∈ c ∪ t, the wire w must be transferred to C; C picks random bits r
and r′, and applies the operator XrZr
′
PC
j−1
x (w) and sends the resulting
quantum state to T; T picks random bits s and s′, and applies the
operator XsZs
′
P T
j−1
x (w) and sends the resulting quantum state to S;
Then S continues next quantum gate Gj+1.)
4. Key-updating: C and T update their keys according to the gates and
their order in the UQC: suppose the j-th gate in the UQC is Gj, C and
T update their keys according to the gate Gj,
Key
j−1
C = (C
j−1
x , C
j−1
z )→ Key
j
C = (C
j
x, C
j
z),
Key
j−1
T = (T
j−1
x , T
j−1
z )→ Key
j
T = (T
j
x , T
j
z ). (4)
For a given UQC, the gates and their order are deterministic, so the
key-updating algorithm is a deterministic algorithm. Later we will
present a detail description about the key-updating algorithm for each
gate Gj ∈ {X, Y, Z,CNOT, H, P,R}.
5. Decryption of the result: After receiving the encrypted result (denote
it as |φ〉) from S, T performs the following decryption transformation
according to his key T kx (c), T
k
z (c):
|φ〉 → |φ′〉 = XT
k
x (c)ZT
k
z (c)|φ〉,
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and sends it to C; C decrypts it according to his key Ckx(c), C
k
z (c):
|φ′〉 → |φ′′〉 = XC
k
x (c)ZC
k
z (c)|φ′〉,
and gets the result finally.
Especially, in Ref.[18], a UQC for near-trivial transformations has been
constructed. The near-trivial transformations are a class of basic transfor-
mations, and any unitary transformation can be decomposed into the prod-
uct of a series of near-trivial transformations [19]. Then we can design a
TBQC protocol based on the UQC for near-trivial transformations. In this
protocol, T can design his quantum algorithm using a series of near-trivial
transformations. Though this UQC is formed by combining the gates se-
lected from the set {Rz(±
pi
2j
), Ry(±
pi
2j
), j ∈ N} and generalized CNOTs,
it can be easily transformed into a new UQC consisting of the gates in
{X, Y, Z,CNOT, H, P,R}. So we can always assume the UQC consists of
the gates in {X, Y, Z,CNOT, H, P,R}.
4.3. Key-updating
In key-updating algorithm, each step of updating in Eq.(4) should satisfy
the following identities (ignoring an irrelevant global phase). For any single-
qubit gate Gj ∈ {X, Y, Z,H, P} (the gate R is an exception) applying on the
w-th qubit, the keys Cj−1x , C
j−1
z , T
j−1
x , T
j−1
z and C
j
x, C
j
z , T
j
x , T
j
z satisfy
Gj(X
C
j−1
x (w)⊕T
j−1
x (w)ZC
j−1
z (w)⊕T
j−1
z (w)) = (XC
j
x(w)⊕T
j
x (w)ZC
j
z (w)⊕T
j
z (w))Gj; (5)
For the two-qubit gate Gj = CNOT applying on the w-th and w
′-th qubits,
the keys Cj−1x , C
j−1
z , T
j−1
x , T
j−1
z and C
j
x, C
j
z , T
j
x , T
j
z satisfy
Gj(X
C
j−1
x (w)⊕T
j−1
x (w)ZC
j−1
z (w)⊕T
j−1
z (w) ⊗XC
j−1
x (w
′)⊕T j−1x (w
′)ZC
j−1
z (w
′)⊕T j−1z (w
′))
= (XC
j
x(w)⊕T
j
x (w)ZC
j
z (w)⊕T
j
z (w) ⊗XC
j
x(w
′)⊕T jx (w
′)ZC
j
z (w
′)⊕T jz (w
′))Gj. (6)
Next, we introduce the key-updating algorithm for each different quan-
tum gate Gj ∈ {X, Y, Z,CNOT, H, P,R}. This algorithm here is similar
to that in Ref.[17] except the two-qubit gate CNOT. To keep the consis-
tence of the notations, we restate the key-updating algorithm for the gates
X, Y, Z,H, P,R using our notations.
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• Let Gj ∈ {X, Y, Z} be the Pauli gate to be executed on wire w ∈ c ∪ t. We
have:
Gj(X
C
j−1
x (w)⊕T
j−1
x (w)ZC
j−1
z (w)⊕T
j−1
z (w))
= (XC
j−1
x (w)⊕T
j−1
x (w)ZC
j−1
z (w)⊕T
j−1
z (w))Gj , (7)
where an irrelevant global phase factor is ignored. Thus, C updates his key
as follow:
Cjx(w) = C
j−1
x (w), C
j
z(w) = C
j−1
z (w),
and T updates his key as follow:
T jx(w) = T
j−1
x (w), T
j
z (w) = T
j−1
z (w).
• Let Gj = H be the Hadamard gate to be executed on wire w ∈ c ∪ t. We
have:
H(XC
j−1
x (w)⊕T
j−1
x (w)ZC
j−1
z (w)⊕T
j−1
z (w))
= (XC
j−1
z (w)⊕T
j−1
z (w)ZC
j−1
x (w)⊕T
j−1
x (w))H, (8)
where an irrelevant global phase factor is ignored. Thus, C updates his key
as follow:
Cjx(w) = C
j−1
z (w), C
j
z(w) = C
j−1
x (w),
and T updates his key as follow:
T jx(w) = T
j−1
z (w), T
j
z (w) = T
j−1
x (w).
• Let Gj = P be the phase gate to be executed on wire w ∈ c ∪ t. Using the
fact that PX = XZP (up to an irrelevant phase factor), we have:
P (XC
j−1
x (w)⊕T
j−1
x (w)ZC
j−1
z (w)⊕T
j−1
z (w))
= (XC
j−1
x (w)⊕T
j−1
x (w)ZC
j−1
x (w)⊕C
j−1
z (w)⊕T
j−1
x (w)⊕T
j−1
z (w))P. (9)
Thus, C updates his key as follow:
Cjx(w) = C
j−1
x (w), C
j
z(w) = C
j−1
x (w)⊕ C
j−1
z (w),
and T updates his key as follow:
T jx(w) = T
j−1
x (w), T
j
z (w) = T
j−1
x (w)⊕ T
j−1
z (w).
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• Let Gj = CNOT be the controlled-NOT gate to be executed on wires
w,w′ ∈ c ∪ t. Assume that w is the control while w′ is the target. The
key-updating algorithm is different from that of Ref.[17]. The reason is as
follow: the CNOT gate is performed by the third party (the server S), who
possesses the two wires w,w′ while computing, thus the CNOT gate would
not be performed nonlocally. Using the fact that CNOT(XjZk ⊗X lZm) =
(XjZk⊕m ⊗Xj⊕lZm)CNOT, we have:
CNOT(XC
j−1
x (w)⊕T
j−1
x (w)ZC
j−1
z (w)⊕T
j−1
z (w)
⊗XC
j−1
x (w
′)⊕T j−1x (w
′)ZC
j−1
z (w
′)⊕T j−1z (w
′))
= (XC
j−1
x (w)⊕T
j−1
x (w)ZC
j−1
z (w)⊕T
j−1
z (w)⊕C
j−1
z (w
′)⊕T j−1z (w
′)
⊗XC
j−1
x (w)⊕T
j−1
x (w)⊕C
j−1
x (w
′)⊕T j−1x (w
′)ZC
j−1
z (w
′)⊕T j−1z (w
′))CNOT.
Thus, C updates his key as follow:
Cjx(w) = C
j−1
x (w), C
j
z(w) = C
j−1
z (w)⊕ C
j−1
z (w
′),
Cjx(w
′) = Cj−1x (w)⊕ C
j−1
x (w
′), Cjz(w
′) = Cj−1z (w
′), (10)
and T updates his key as follow:
T jx(w) = T
j−1
x (w), T
j
z (w) = T
j−1
z (w)⊕ T
j−1
z (w
′),
T jx(w
′) = T j−1x (w)⊕ T
j−1
x (w
′), T jz (w
′) = T j−1z (w
′). (11)
• Let Gj = R be executed on wire w ∈ c ∪ t. In the protocol, C and T apply
quantum operators XrZr
′
PC
j−1
x (w) and XsZs
′
P T
j−1
x (w), respectively. Accord-
ing to the deduction in Ref.[17], we have:
(XsZs
′
P T
j−1
x (w))(XrZr
′
PC
j−1
x (w))R(XC
j−1
x (w)⊕T
j−1
x (w)ZC
j−1
z (w)⊕T
j−1
z (w)) =
Xs⊕r⊕C
j−1
x (w)⊕T
j−1
x (w)Zs
′⊕r′⊕C
j−1
x (w)⊕T
j−1
x (w)⊕C
j−1
z (w)⊕T
j−1
z (w)⊕(r⊕C
j−1
x (w))·T
j−1
x (w)R,
where an irrelevant global phase factor is ignored. Because r ⊕ Cj−1x (w) is
known only by C and T j−1x (w) is known only by T, an AND-BOX is called to
compute two bits α, β, such that α ⊕ β = (r ⊕ Cj−1x (w)) · T
j−1
x (w). Assume
C obtains α and T obtains β after calling the AND-BOX. Thus, C updates
his key as follow:
Cjx(w) = r ⊕ C
j−1
x (w), C
j
z(w) = r
′ ⊕ α⊕ Cj−1z (w)⊕ C
j−1
x (w), (12)
and T updates his key as follow:
T jx(w) = s⊕ T
j−1
x (w), T
j
z (w) = s
′ ⊕ β ⊕ T j−1z (w)⊕ T
j−1
x (w). (13)
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4.4. Analysis
Protocol 2 is analyzed from the correctness and security (blindness and
verifiability) in the following.
Theorem 4 (Correctness). Assume C, S and T follow the steps of
Protocol 2, then the outcome is correct.
Proof. According to the key-updating algorithm, if the three parties follow
the steps of Protocol 2, S carries out the UQC CU , and outputs the n +m-
qubit state
XC
k
x (c)⊕T
k
x (c)ZC
k
z (c)⊕T
k
z (c)(Ue|d〉)⊗X
Ckx (t)⊕T
k
x (t)ZC
k
z (t)⊕T
k
z (t)(|e〉), (14)
where |d〉 is the data owned by C, e ∈ {0, 1}m is the encoding owned by T,
Ue is the quantum transformation corresponding to the encoding e. S sends
the former n qubits to T, then T performs decryption transformation and
gets XC
k
x (c)ZC
k
z (c)(Ue|d〉), and sends it to C. Finally, C performs decryption
transformation and gets the required result Ue|d〉. Thus, the outcome is
correct. 
Theorem 5 (Blindness). Protocol 2 is blind.
Proof. In Protocol 2, C and T encrypt their privacy (the data and encod-
ing) with quantum one-time pad before sending them, and their initial keys
are selected locally by themselves. So no information about their initial keys
is leaked. During the interaction of the protocol, they update their keys by
locally performing a computing on their keys, except the execution of R gate.
Whenever a R gate is executed, the key-updating algorithm needs to call an
AND-BOX once. Thus, whether their keys is leaked depends on the secu-
rity of the AND-BOX. Given an ideal AND-BOX, the information of keys
(including every key that are obtained during the key-updating process) can
be kept secret perfectly. Because the privacy is protected by the quantum
one-time pad and the keys are not leaked, the privacy (the data, encoding
and result) of C and T are protected perfectly. Thus, Protocol 2 is blind. 
Similar to Protocol 1, Protocol 2 does not satisfy strong verifiability. It
only satisfies weak verifiability. How to transform it into a TBQC protocol
with strong verifiability? This problem will be discussed in the next section.
Theorem 6. Protocol 2 can defeat collusive attack.
Proof. In Protocol 2, all the privacy of T and C have been encrypted with
quantum one-time pad when the protocol begins. During the whole process
of computation, the privacy are in the state of being encrypted, and the
decryption key is unknown by the others. For example, in the final step, the
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privacy are in the state shown by Eq.(14), and the two decryption keys are
(Ckx(c)⊕T
k
x (c), C
k
z (c)⊕T
k
z (c)) and (C
k
x(t)⊕T
k
x (t), C
k
z (t)⊕T
k
z (t)), respectively.
It can be seen that, for each key, half information is owned by C, and the
other half is owned by T, and neither of them can decrypt it alone. Then, if S
and C cooperate, they cannot attack the privacy of T. If S and T cooperate,
they cannot attack the privacy of C. Thus, Protocol 2 can defeat collusive
attack. 
5. Discussions
Both the TBQC protocols 1 and 2 satisfy the weak verifiability, that
means the check of the result depends on the problem itself. How to design
a TBQC protocol, such that it has strong verifiability? For this problem, a
possible way is: firstly performing quantum authentication on the quantum
data, and then performing TBQC protocol 2. Concretely, the TBQC protocol
2 can be improved using the technique proposed in Ref.[20], where clifford-
based quantum authentication code [3] is used to authenticate the result.
The details will be given in the future.
Though the model presented here involves three participants, when two
of them cooperate completely, it would degenerate to the BQC model that
are usually studied. Thus, the TBQC model can be regarded as an extension
of BQC model. If C and T cooperate completely, it corresponds to the
BQC model, where the Client owns the data and algorithm and delegates
his computational task to the Server. If T and S cooperate completely, it
corresponds to the BQC model, where the Server provides the computational
resources and algorithm, and the algorithm is private by the Client, see
Ref.[11]. If C and S cooperate completely, it corresponds to the BQC model,
where one party has data and enough computational resources and the other
party owns the algorithms, and the latter provides the algorithm to the
former in a blind way. This case is worth for future research.
6. Conclusions
This paper extends the BQC model, and proposes a TBQC model. The
TBQC model is a special case of three-party secure computation, where the
three parties play the different roles. This case exists widely and is worth
to study. Here, two concrete protocols are constructed. The first protocol
cannot defeat collusive attack. The second one is constructed based on UQC.
It is proved that it is correct, blind, and can defeat collusive attack.
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